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Abstract
According to the related data from the department of 
monitor & law enforcement in Liaoning Province and 
combining the current situation of enforcing law and 
the development of labor relation enforcement in China, 
this paper set forth the problems of rights linking and 
communicating within enforcement mechanism itself and 
between government and enterprises, made research and 
analysis on cause and put forward a serial resolutions in 
addressing these problems by using for reference from 
experiences of labor relation outside.
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1.  THE CURRENT SITUATION OF MONITOR 
& ENFORCING LAW ON LABOR RELATION
1.1  Certain Progress on Work of Monitor & 
Enforcing Law on Labor Relation
Government plays the role of guardian for labor’s basic 
right. On the side of government and holding the working 
idea of “publicizing, service, monitoring and right 
protection”, all labor protecting and monitoring bodies in 
Liaoning Province gave full play to monitoring function 
and made efforts to strength the publicity of labor safety 
law and regulation, labor monitoring and enforcement and 
the adjusting capability on labor disputes for both year 
of 2008 and 2009, and conducted the implementation to 
daily inspection, disposing complaint, right to salary by 
peasant-worker and “double net-covering” of labor safety 
& monitoring. 
Based on related data from Northeast news net, rate of 
case closed of complaint by peasant-worker in Liaoning 
Province increased from 93% in 2007 up to 100% in 
2010 (see Figure 1). This shows that monitor & enforcing 
law bodies in Liaoning Province has strengthened the 
administration of law and has shifted the manner to 
peasant-worker’s issue, made every effort to guarantee the 
legal rights and interests for labors.
Graph 1
Rate of Case Closed to Peasant-Worker in Liaoning Province from 2008 to 2011
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The security payments shall be launched to pay wage 
default to peasant-workers according to The Payment 
Approval Process to Peasant-worker in Construction 
Industry in Dalian City”. The security payment was set 
aiming to prevent construction enterprises defaulting 
wages to peasant-workers, and was deposited in advance 
by construction enterprises to bank assigned by municipal 
government. Conducting in October in 2008, the security 
payments had collected RMB 465 million accumulatively 
in 2009 and RMB 770 million in September in 2010 (see 
Figure 2). The implementation of this security payments 
institution provides guarantee to wage default to peasant-
worker and is another innovate to monitoring & enforcing 
law system. 
Figure 2
Related Data of Security Payments Collection on Peasant-Worker’S Wage in Dalian
1.2  Vulnerable Groups and Power Groups During 
Law Enforcement
Some monitor facilities in county level only staffed 2 
or 3 inspectors and some of them are appointed multi-
position, thus leas to the diffi culties to focus on enforcing 
law working. The symposium hold by Ministry of Labor 
in 2008 shows that, among 3271 labor monitoring bodies, 
771 are the combining bodies of labor arbitration, petition 
and legal system, which blocks the effective promotion on 
labor monitoring working. 
1.3  Awkward Posi t ion and Compromise 
Compelled to Enforcing Law Body Due to Its 
Collision to Local Government
This phenomenon mainly resulted from some incorrect 
idea in society: fi rst is the existence of local protectionism. 
At present, part of foreign investing enterprises refused to 
insure the security payments by taking the excuses of the 
policy of “improving investment environment, attracting 
investment and developing economy”. Secondly, the 
fact that the minority business leaders view enforcing 
law as the aggravating business burden, which covers 
some unlawful acts objectively and leads to unnecessary 
approval procedure for normal enforcing law working 
and sets block to process; Thirdly, the minority takes 
money for service to enterprises rather than assisting norm 
regulating. They do not receive enforcing law, even with 
contradict morale. Thus causes the powerless in enforcing 
law process within labor safety monitoring bodies due to 
the consideration of the effect on attracting investment.
1.4  Common Occurrence on Illegal Act by 
Enterprises
On the basis of related data from present-worker’s right 
protection center and labor monitoring body in Shenyang, 
back payment to peasant-workers was RMB 41.17 million 
from December in 2006 to August in 2007, RMB 57 
million from the end of 2008 to the end of 2009 and RMB 
66.9 million in 2010 (see Figure 2). It follows that back 
payments are increasing year by year, on the one hand, it 
refl ects the outstanding achievement gained by monitoring 
& enforcing law body and their focusing on protecting 
peasant-worker’s rights and interests, on the other hand, 
it also exposes the escalation of illegal action from side-
on. This includes: some intermediaries provide false info 
to labor illegally and cheat labors’ job hunting fee; some 
non state-owned foreign enterprises, private enterprises 
do not sign labor contract with employees, fi re labors with 
no proper reason, dock wages, default wages especially 
to overtime wages to peasant-workers. The acts against 
law of paying social insurance are in common, some cases 
are becoming grouping accidents through the evolution 
between labors and enterprises due to delayed correction. 
This indicates the existence of leak in monitoring & 
enforcing law mechanism which can not reduce the illegal 
activities in root cause. 
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Figure 3 
Data of Back Payment to Peasant-Worker from Monitoring & Enforcing Law Bodies in Shenyang and Peasant-
Worker’s Rights Protection Center
2.  PROBLEMS WITHIN MONITORING 
& ENFORCING LAW MECHANISM OF 
LABOR RELATION
This paper holds the view that the government are playing 
the role both of the protector to labor’s basic rights and 
the promoter to negotiation between enterprise and 
employees. Thus, government plays a major role among 
trilateral labor relation. The monitoring & enforcing law 
mechanism is effective tool of government to supervise 
enterprises’ fulfi llment on its obligations and the executor 
of government. However, they are all facing the problems 
of mismatching rights and liabilities with greater 
obligations. The following three aspects show:
2.1  Mismatching Rights and Liabilities with 
Greater Obligations in Monitoring & Enforcing 
Law Mechanism of Labor Relation
2.1.1  Lack of Mandatory in Enforcing Law
The issue of Labor Supervising Regulation in 1993, The 
Regulations of Labor Safeguard Supervising in 2004 and a 
series of other department rules witnessed the progress of 
labor supervising growing out of nothing and from weak 
to strong. But there are still no mandatory measures to 
seal up goods, freezing accounts, confi scating illegal gains 
and investigating legal liabilities etc.. In addition, ordering 
to make correction is mainly adapted to deal with illegal 
activities by enterprises rather than some mandatory 
measures. 
2.1.2  Short-Staffed Law Enforcement Offi cials
Now, labor disputed cases are increasing with over 20% 
annual. The ratio of labor supervising staff number with 
employees is 1:20000, however, comparing with 1:8000 
in developed countries. This data clearly shows we are 
serious lacking enforcement staff in labor supervising. The 
increasing number of cases and the short-staffed personnel 
leads to delaying prompt correcting and investigating on 
cases, enforcing law mechanism can not give full play to 
their function. 
2.1.3  Serious Lacking Funds in Law Enforcement
There is no suffi cient fi nancial inputs from government to 
labor supervising working, both through actual demand 
and comparing with international level. This is also can be 
exposed from personnel allocation. It is insuffi cient funds 
that block all supervising working in smooth.
2.2  Drawbacks in Rights Engagement Between 
Monitoring & Enforcing Law Mechanism and 
Local Government System
2.2.1  The Drawback of Dual Leadership System Itself
China has ini t ial ly set  up the labor monitoring 
organization on centre, province, municipality and county 
level. Local labor safeguard institutions are under the dual 
leadership of society security administrative department at 
same level and its superior body. It is under the leadership 
structure of governments at upper level. However, it is 
local governments that exercise dominant right due to 
territorial jurisdiction principal. Hence, undefi ned division 
of labor in functional departments between monitoring 
institution and government causes the appearance of 
prevarication, no supervising, cross enforcing law and 
overlapping enforcing law etc.. 
2.2.2  Local Protectionism Blocks the Law of 
Enforcement
It is common occurrence that put capital first followed 
by labor force in unbalanced labor and capital structure. 
Some monitoring institutions were blocked by government 
intercepting while dealing with labor-capital relation in 
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private enterprise. Undue focusing on the development of 
territorial economy and the ignorance to the protection on 
labor’s rights and interests and the promoting GDP lead to 
being partial to enterprises with holding unscientifi c views 
on political achievements.
2.2.3  The Confl ict Between Monitoring Working and 
Several Regulations of Attracting Investment
For the purpose of maximizing investment scale, some 
local governments even offered preferential terms by the 
condition of no social insurance payment and neglecting 
minimum wage to attract foreign investment. Some 
local governments are supportive to labor union just in 
appearance and take sides on employers in reality, even 
intervening the protecting rights and interesting activities 
by labor union. 
2.3  Serious Backward Informatization of 
Mechanism and Lacking Understanding 
Enterprises
2.3.1  Unclear Labor Status
Hua Jianmin, vice chairman of National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee, made a inspection report 
on labor contract enforcing law. The report indicated that 
part of labor-intensive medium-sized and small enterprises 
and non-state owned enterprises singed labor contracts 
with low rate, some contracts were signed with lack of 
standardization and poor performance. Several places 
are still unclear with the status of contracts signing and 
employment. 
2.3.2  Delaying Informed Evasive Action
It is quite common to see that enterprises take evasive 
action by changing right as principal and business pattern 
in reality. The loophole of current law and provision to 
deal with this kind of evasive action leads to no rule to 
comply with. The serious lacking of informationize and 
delaying informed evasive action provide the chance for 
enterprises to avoiding their duty. 
2.3.3  Short of Platform for Information Inspected
The short of platform for information inspected go 
against taking over enterprise’s info completely, timely 
and accurately, and block to work out scientific policy 
guidance. Insufficient and incomplete inspection on 
administration cannot provide the basis to macro-decision 
making timely. 
3.  CAUSE FOR PROBLEMS WITHIN 
MONITORING & ENFORCING LAW 
MECHANISM IN LABOR RELATION
3.1  Late Starting on Development of Labor 
Monitoring System in Domestic and Lacking 
Attention from Leadership at All Level
3.1.1  Lacking of Correct Understanding for Labor Monitoring 
Working from Both Enterprise and Government
Labor monitoring is the product of industrialization. 
Laboring shall be accompanied by labor monitoring in 
market economy. Since the establishment of New China, 
we have gradually set up labor monitoring system on the 
main role of labor security and hygiene inspection. The 
late starting of labor monitoring system establishment 
lead to poor awareness of enforcement and insufficient 
understanding and correct acquaintance to monitoring 
working.
3.1.2  Slow Development of Labor Monitoring 
Mechanism in China
With the rapid economic structure adjustment during 
opening-up and reform, the process of labor monitoring 
in China has entered another new stage. While reforming 
in state council in 2008, the establishment of labor 
supervisory bureau by HR and Ministry of Labor 
strengthened the government’s function to supervising 
HR market, adjusting labor relation and developing social 
insurance. The development of labor monitoring system 
is growing at low stage and poor strength during this long 
period, inspectors do not have real power and compulsory 
executive enforcement to deal with back wage cases. 
3.1.3  Lack of Supportive from Government
Service-oriented government shall adjust the number of 
department according the demand of social governing, the 
department of labor monitoring shall be expanded, which 
all shall be paid attention to by leaders at all level. It is 
a common difficulty that monitoring working is hard to 
carry on, which is mainly caused by the misunderstanding 
by part leaders and the ignorance to monitoring, thus 
impose negative effect on labor monitoring. 
3.2  Crosswise Legal Enforcement Power and 
Unclear Functions Among Departments
3.2.1  Crosswise Legal Enforcement Power
The phenomenon of crosswise legal enforcement power 
can be indicated as the saying goes: do not govern with 
power, should govern without power. There are causes of 
unclear legislation and unreasonable department setting. 
The excessive scattering crosswise legal enforcement 
power and lack of cooperation leads to each doing things 
in its own way, insuperable contradictions and ineffective 
enforcing the law.
3.2.2  Unreasonable Department Setting
The corresponding enforcement institutions have emerged 
with the issue of laws and regulations. Although making 
significant progress through a number of governmental 
structures reforming, we still face the problems of 
scattering governing function and unreasonable 
department setting, which brought out inconvenience, 
duplicate law enforcement and disturbing residents while 
enforcing. 
3.2.3  Unclear Distributing of Responsibilities and 
Interests Among Departments
Unclear responsibility among departments leads to 
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avoiding duties and fi ghting for interests. This ambiguity 
of obligation and power dividing causes departments to 
participate actively to the projects with profi table results, 
even through acting beyond authority on purpose. 
3.3  Lack of Cooperation and Trust Among 
Government, Labor Union and Entrepreneur 
Association
3.3.1  Enterprises are Lacking Trust to Government
In recent years, due to shortening of labor monitoring, 
many labor disputes cases without prompt handling have 
became grouping incidents, which imposed enormous 
pressure on government daily working and grievous 
damaged the government image. It is mainly because 
there is no suffi cient communication between enterprises 
and labor monitoring department and no labor relation 
standardized. 
3.3.2  No Mutual Cooperating Mechanism Formed 
Between Enterprises and Labor Union
There is not sufficient cooperating on division of duty. 
Some enterprises, on the purpose of production and profi t 
maximizing, violated labors’ legal rights and interests 
through no signing contracts. Union right protecting shall 
be with labors wherever they are. Part of labors’ rights and 
interests can not be ensured due to lacking of cooperating 
of enterprises and labor union.
3.3.3  Lack of Communication Between Government 
and Labor Union
As a mass organization voluntarily jointed by labors, labor 
union’s work includes the social policies of labors social 
environment, social composing, social demanding and 
other labor-related policies. The lack of communicating 
between government and labor union, however, leads to 
distrust with each other and unable to listen to labors’ 
ideas. The common hot spots, diffi cult points can not be 
solved with unfulfi lling obligations to protect basic labors’ 
rights. 
4.  MEASURES TAKEN TO SOLVE THE 
PROBLEMS WITHIN LABOR MONITORING 
& ENFORCING LAW MECHANISM
4.1  Strengthen Enforcing Power and Continue to 
Improve Monitoring Mechanism
4.1.1  Strengthen Enforcing Power and Improve 
Enforcing Procedure
Formal polyphyletic governing theory mainly focuses on 
policies and actions taken. In this theory, the government 
shall properly intervene with economic activities and 
balance conflict of interest for the labor and the capital 
without harming the third party’s (such as consume) 
interests. Thus, the government plays the role of making 
policy and carrying forward practices.
This paper shows the following power that labor 
safeguard shall have: asking and assisting, inspectors have 
the right to ask public security and industry and commerce 
department to assist their work where necessary; sealing 
up and assisting, labor safeguard department has the right 
to seal up and detain enterprise’s property or apply to the 
court to preserve to employing unit who fail to operate 
business or default wages or escape. For the cases related 
to bankrupt, pay wage, insurance to protect their rights 
and interest before assets cleared. Executive power, 
impose fine to punish employing unit in the case of 
serious threatening benefi ciary’s normal life. Change the 
situation of sole enforcing power means and poor rigidity 
by strengthening labor monitoring & enforcing power. 
4.1.2  Valuing Personnel Building and Increasing Staff 
Allocation
Personnel building are the foundation to labor monitoring 
& enforcing law working. As for lacking of staff and 
backward of personnel building, all local governments 
shall pay high attention to increasing personnel formation, 
funds, and material organization to fully secure the 
capacity of labor monitoring group. Thus the monitoring 
work can be implemented with more professional, 
reutilizations and better in expanding scale and clearing 
blind sides. 
4.1.3  Sound Laws and Regulations and Complete 
Supporting Policies
As for the reality of lagging labor safeguard laws and 
regulations and uncompleted supporting policies, related 
departments shall strengthen legislation research, listen 
to suggests from inspectors on the ground, make labor 
safeguard laws and regulations adaptable to social 
development, easy operating and with foresight. At the 
same time, the related interpretation and supporting policy 
shall be came out timely according to social situation to 
provide legal base to prevent and combat illegal activities. 
4.2  Borrow Ideas from Centralization Labor 
Monitoring Organizing Form in Japan
As to centralization labor organizing, is monitoring form 
directed to superior institution and belonged to central 
department. It is centralized model that lead by one branch 
in central government (See Figure 4).
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Figure 4
Organization Charts for Centralization Labor Monitoring Organization
4.2.1  Strengthening Independence of Case Handling
Centralization labor monitoring department has the power 
independent to local government and do not have to asking 
for local government while dealing with monitoring 
work according to specific laws and regulations. In this 
independent manner to strengthen case handling, the labor 
monitoring department can focus on monitoring operation 
and carrying its function in professions. 
4.2.2  Self-Directed to Finance and Labor Power
Same as the most bodies directly under the central 
leadership, wage and operation funds of centralization 
labor monitoring organization are allocated from central 
finance with relatively independent right of use. Also, 
personnel application features independence as well. Thus, 
the local government’s disturb can be effective avoided 
and secure “order to transmit to lower levels smoothly, 
order unobstructed”. 
4.2.3  Improve Specialty to Monitor
Central and selection organization is the functional 
department to perform monitoring function. Carrying 
monitoring work is its sole operation. Thus, there needs 
more professional pattern in this resource allocation, 
personnel and other organizing form. 
4.3  Setting up Actively Monitoring Mechanism 
and Opening Information Channel
The first role of government is a protector or governor. 
First, the basic rights covered by government includes: 
labor contract, labor standards, labor insurance, labor 
welfare, labor educating and labor safety etc. second, 
monitoring includes: monitoring beforehand, processing 
and results. Hence, labor monitoring is the critical vital 
task for government. 
4.3.1  Combine Daily Monitoring and Specific 
Monitoring
Organize labor monitoring and back wage cases punishing 
at regular intervals. Carry out flexibility enforcement of 
leniency and strictness, set up defaulting wage warning 
system, start using labor monitoring info system and 
improve enforcing process to enhance monitoring 
effi ciency. 
4.3.2  Open Petition Channel to Accuse Illegal 
Activities 
Set up the mechanism for leader reception, handing cases 
and supervising, set up return visit working system and 
put the problems refl ected in to practice. Build up petition 
system on net and hot wire telephone, issue hot wire 
line through media and internet for unblocked petition 
channel. 
4 .3 .3   Communicate  and Exchange  Between 
Enterprises and Government
The communication and exchange between enterprises and 
government can improve mutual trust and cooperation. 
Governments can express the idea of concern and 
supports through meeting high level leaders in enterprises, 
and enterprises can obtain trust from the government by 
bearing more social responsibilities and charitable work. 
In brief, government plays a significant role of both 
protector to labor rights and interests and promoter to 
negotiation between unit and labors. Labor monitoring 
is the product of government functions and establishing 
sound labor relation monitoring mechanism is responsible 
not to be neglected. Completing enforcing law mechanism 
is the guarantee to realize labors’ rights and their 
enthusiasm, thus achieve the optimizing allocation in 
human resources. 
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